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DEREK BOK AND THE MERGER OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS
Herbert Hovenkamp*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Both the novelty and the uniqueness of the "law and economics" movement of the last fifteen years have been greatly exaggerated. Law and economics has been with us for at least a half
century, in nearly every area of private and public law. 1 The
most outspoken protagonists of law and economics admit that
economics had a presence in antitrust and regulatory policy long
before the work of Ronald Coase, Lester Telser, and others inspired its expanded use in areas of private law, such as tort and
contract. 2 But even then, some of those who would make such an
admission would argue that the courts developed a uniquely "economic approach" 3 to antitrust only in the late seventies, and,
since that time, have applied it only haltingly."
• Professor of Law, Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to
Professors Thomas E. Kauper and Louis B. Schwartz for reading a draft.
1. See, e.g., J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); R. ELY, PROPERTY
AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914); Ave-Lallemant, Critique of a Revision of Some Fundamental Economic Concepts, 18 MARQ. L.
REV. 20 (1933); Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371 (1925); Commons, The
Problem of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics, 8 Wis. L. REV. 3 (1932); Dawson &
Cooper, The Effect of Infi,ation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33
MICH. L. REV. 706, 852 (1935); Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J. 489
(1924); Healy, Economic Surplus and the Law, 6 DICTA 15 (1928); Heilman, The Correlation Between the Sciences of Law and Economics, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1932); Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Confi,ict of Laws, 43 YALE L.J. 1082
(1934); Humble, Economics from a Legal Standpoint, 42 AM. L. REv. 379 (1908); Lichtman, Economics, the Basis of Law, 61 AM. L. REV. 357 (1927); Richberg, Economic Illusion Underlying Law, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1933); Richberg, The Supreme Court Discusses Value, 37 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1924); Solterer, Relations Between Economics and
Juridical Science, 21 GEO. L.J. 9 (1932).
2. Economic analysis of property and contract has been common since the beginning
of the century. See, e.g., the works by Ely and by Commons, supra note 1.
3. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Refi,ections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 972 (1986); Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 SuP. CT. REv. 319; see also Kaplow, Antitrust, Law
and Economics, and the Courts, LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 181 (argu-
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Any notion that courts first adopted an economic approach to
questions of antitrust policy in the late 1970's is historically myopic. What they really did was discard one particular economic
model-a model heavily influenced by Harvard economist Edward Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 5
and Harvard industrial organization economist Joe Bain's Barriers to New Competition 8-and replace it with a more traditional, distinctively neoclassical, economic model, inspired most
directly by the followers of Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of
Economics' carried traditional British neoclassicism to its apogee in 1890.8
Derek Bok's well-known and influential article on merger policy and economics, 9 published in 1960, advocated an economic
approach to one particular area of federal antitrust policy, albeit
a different approach from the one that Professor Richard Posner
began to advocate·a decade or so later.1° Bok's approach was different, not because it was not "economic," but because it was
based on a different set of economic assumptions, many of which
would lose favor with a later generation of economists. At least
one recent writer has suggested that Bok's Section 7 inaugurated a "first wave" of economic analysis in American merger
policy, while the rise of the Chicago School and the publication
of the revised Justice Department Merger Guidelines in 1982
signalled a second wave. 11
But more than economics guided Bok's Section 7. Bok attempted to forge a merger policy that was sensitive to Congressional concerns about rising concentration and injury to small
business, as well as to more economic concerns about monopoly
pricing. 12 Ultimately, those two policies proved mutually inconing that the law and economics revolution has not influenced the Supreme Court nearly
as much as the underlying political commitments of its justices).
5. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
6. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); see also Bain, Economies of Scale,
Concentration, and Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM.
ECON. REV. 15 (1954).
7. A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).
8. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219-23
(1985).
9. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
10. E.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 78-134 (1976); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562
(1969).

11. Fox, Introduction: The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists are Kings?,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 281 (1983).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
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sistent. By trying to follow both, the Warren Court's merger policy became irrational and inconsistent, but only a small part of
the blame for that development can be laid at the feet of Derek
Bok. He had assigned himself the task-one of the most difficult
for any economic policymaker in a democracy 13-of harmonizing
the-economic theory of his day with the manifestly noneconomic
concerns of Congress. That he took both of these problems seriously is a tribute to his fidelity to the American principles of
government, if not to the merger policy that resulted.
Legislative intent aside, the perceived economic problem of
mergers had become unruly and, some believed, intractable by
1960. Derek Bok's Section 7 attempted to make merger policy
rational within the confines of an economic model that had
grown so complex that no court could ever hope to measure all
the factors that might be relevant to evaluating the competitive
consequences of a merger. Importantly, Bok did not challenge
the model itself in any fundamental way. Like Edward
Chamberlin, 14 Joe Bain,1 11 Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner, 16
the members of the 1955 Attorney General's National Committee to study the Antitrust Laws,1 7 and many leading 1940's and
1950's economists, 18 Derek Bok entertained a certain suspicion
of the power of the "invisible hand" of the marketplace to determine optimal industry structure, price, and output. 19 To be sure,
that suspicion was tempered a good deal, and Bok believed that
Congress was excessively concerned about the impact of mergers
on small, less efficient businesses. Nevertheless, he concluded
that mergers should be condemned at much smaller marketshare levels than would generally result in condemnation today.
In addition, Bok developed a set of simple presumptive merger
tests, based on his own strong feelings that the economic consid13. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 249-55.
14. See supra note 5.
15. See supra note 6.
16. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1959); see infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
17. See ATTORNEY GEN.'S NAT'L CoMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JusT., REPORT (1955) [hereinafter REPORT]. For information on the origin and writing of
that Report, see T. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER AoMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE JusTICE DEPARTMENT 17-49 (1980); Hovenkamp, Book Review, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 755 (1982)
(reviewing Kovaleff's book).
18. For names and specific works, see Bok, supra note 9, passim.
19. The principal sources of industrial organization and price theory upon which Bok
relied were J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); w. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG
THE FEw (1949); and F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION (1952).

Journal of Law Reform

518

[VOL. 21:4

erations at issue in merger cases had become too complex to be
taken into account in any comprehensive way in litigation.
The result was a merger policy that was both administratively
simple and hostile to many mergers that would be considered
quite harmless by 1980's standards. Moreover, many subsequent
judicial decisions cited Bok's work, 20 several of which are considered flawed in some fundamental way by many antitrust scholars today. Then Assistant Professor Bok21 clearly did not intend
all of these results.

II.

THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF BoK'S SECTION

7

Merger policy both before and during the Warren Court era
was guided by different values and assumptions from today.
However, the assumptions were not altogether as different as
they have been described in some Chicago School literature;
they certainly are not as grotesque and pernicious as the view
painted in Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, 22 which suggests that 1960's merger policy was concerned predominantly
with condemning mergers because they produced efficiencies
and injured smaller, less efficient competitors as a result. Former
Judge Bork would have us believe that, during the Warren era,
mergers that benefitted consumers were generally illegal, while
mergers that injured consumers while benefitting competitors
were generally quite legal. To be sure, some cases, particularly
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 23 are consistent with that
proposition, but the threat of monopoly pricing was an important concern of 1960's merger policy, just as it is today.
The chief differences between that merger policy and the policy of the 1980's are: (1) the 1960's economic model for antitrust
analysis had less confidence that the market itself would discipline firms and force them to behave competitively; and (2) although the threat of monopoly pricing was an important concern
of 1960's merger policy, it was not the exclusive concern; the
courts tried to be attentive to Congress's directive, manifested in
the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton Act, to protect
"competition" by preserving small business. 24
20. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
21. He is now president of Harvard University.
22. · R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 198-262 (1978).
23. 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (discussing proposed
amendments to § 7).
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The Revolt Against Classicism

Dominant economic theory from the New Deal and the 1940's
was characterized by a deep distrust of the unregulated market,
undoubtedly influenced by the Great Depression of the 1930's.
The seminal work of economic theory symbolizing this distrust
was Edward Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, published in 1933. 211 The great evil in Chamberlin's economic model was product differentiation, which permitted modern manufacturing firms to avoid head-to-head competition with
one another. Once a firm produced a product that was somehow
different in the eyes of consumers from the products made by its
competitors, the firm could count on a certain group of customers who preferred its particular brand and were willing to pay a
premium for it. As a result, the firm faced a downward sloping
demand curve similar to the monopolist's demand curve, although not as steep, rather than the horizontal demand curve
faced by the perfect competitor. 26
However, the firm in Chamberlin's model was not really a
"monopolist" in the pure sense-that is, it was not a firm that
could set its price and output free of concern about the decisions
of others. On the contrary, it faced many competitors with capabilities equal to its own. As a result, the firm competed by attempting to enhance the degree of product differentiation between its own offerings and those of other firms. It did this
through stylistic or other frivolous innovations that would not
have been considered cost-justified in a more perfectly competitive market. It also offered a host of services that were not competitively justified. It integrated vertically in order to place its
own brand more prominently than others in front of the consumer. Perhaps most importantly, it engaged in outrageous
amounts of advertising that exaggerated the difference between
its own offering and those of its competitors, as well as the
higher quality of its own product.
The result of all of this activity was not particularly favorable
to anyone except, perhaps, to the firm's design engineers and advertising executives. Output was lower and prices were higher
than they would have been under perfect competition, but as a
general rule, the firms in these product-differentiated markets
did not earn monopoly profits. They spent most of their antici25.
26.

E.

CHAMBERLIN, supra

See

note 5.

H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

1-39 (1985).
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pated monopoly returns on the excessive innovation, advertising,
and other extraordinary efforts necessary to create and maintain
the consumer perception that they had something unique to sell.
Furthermore, they chronically carried wasteful excess capacity
because they did not operate as price takers, but were constantly
reducing output to a perceived profit-maximizing level. "Monopolistic competition" was the worst of both worlds: monopoly
price and output, but only competitive rates of return. 27
Like most elegant models that appear to explain just about
everything, the theory of monopolistic competition influenced
many subsequent thinkers who refined, extrapolated from, or
critiqued the basic model. Much of the price theory and industrial organization literature of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's was
of this sort, and the implications for antitrust policy were plain
enough. 28 Essentially, these implications can be summarized as:
(1) A feeling that not all product differentiation, advertising, or
even innovation is in the best interest of consumers or the economy; some of it may be quite pernicious; (2) A belief that noncompetitive performance could result at much lower concentration levels than previously thought necessary, and that no
"agreement" among the firms was necessary to produce this bad
result; simple monopolistic "competition" among firms was sufficient; and (3) A much broader belief than before that large firms
behave "strategically"-most particularly, that they design and
price products not to please customers, but because certain price
or innovation decisions might deter or delay entry by other
competitors.
The monopolistic competition paradigm remained relatively
robust in academic writing on antitrust policy, even as economists were becoming more critical of its underlying assumptions.
For example, in the introduction to their influential 1959 book
27. For a more complete discussion of monopolistic competition, see R. ROBINSON,
COLUMBIA ESSAYS ON GREAT ECONOMISTS: EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN (1971); A. THOMPSON,
JR., ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM (4th ed. 1985); G. TuLLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF
POLITICS 62-81 (1967).
28. See, e.g., STAFF OF TEMPORARY NAT'L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SEss., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: ANTITRUST IN ACTION (Senate
Comm. Print 1941) (Monograph written by W. Hamilton and I. Till); STAFF OF TEMPORARY NAT'L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER: COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Senate Comm.
Print 1940) (Monograph written by C. Wilcox); A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION
(1936); R. TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
(1940); Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REV. 241
(1940). Admiring, but nevertheless critical, are J. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 79 (1942); 1 J. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 65 (1939).
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on antitrust policy, 29 Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner
adopted.a set of assumptions heavily influenced by the monopolistic competition paradigm. 30 The less academic but equally influential Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws 31 implicitly made the same assumptions, 32 although it shows some influence from economists,
such as John Maurice Clark, who had become increasingly critical of the monopolistic competition model. 33
The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments that expanded the
coverage of section 7 of the Clayton Act had at least a few ideological roots in the same garden. As Bok noted, the amendments
were not designed merely to close one or two "loopholes" in the
original Clayton Act merger provision of 1914.34 Rather, Congress intended "to create a new statutory formula for determining the legality of mergers. " 311 Bok traced the impetus for the
Celler-Kefauver amendments back to writing on economics and
the corporation from the New Deal Era, 36 particularly to Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Property, written in 1932, which drew an ominous picture
of the large corporation's search for size for its own sake, in spite
of productive as well as allocative inefficiencies. 37 For example,
because the ownership and control of the corporation had become functionally separated from one another, management
could no longer be trusted to maximize the corporation's profits
and might wish instead to maximize its gross revenues, its market share, the number of markets in which it did business, or
some other measure of managerial success. The result was a
trend toward concentration unjustified by the natural, efficiencygenerating forces of the neoclassical marketplace. Together,
Chamberlin's Monopolistic Competition and Berle and Means's
The Modern Corporation and Private Property signalled the
death of the "classical" corporation and its replacement by a
29. C. KAYSEN AND D. TURNER, supra note 16.
30. Id. at 7-9.
31. REPORT, supra note 17.
32. See id. at 315-40.
33. See id. at 337-39.
34. Bok, supra note 9, at 306. The loopholes were that the original § 7: (1) applied
only to stock acquisitions, not to asset acquisitions; and (2) prohibited only those mergers tending to eliminate competition "between" the merging firms-thus suggesting application only to horizontal and perhaps potential-competition mergers, but not to vertical mergers.
35. Id. (citing D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 267 (1959)).
36. See id. at 230-31.
37. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1046 (1932).
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corporation whose activities were much more intensively scrutinized and regulated by the State. 38
This economic perspective resulted in an immense concern expressed in federal agency publications of the next two decades
over perceived growth in corporate concentration, which was
more or less assumed to be bad per se. 39 Derek Bok did not
make the same assumption, agreeing rather with an important
1950 study by Lintner and Butters that most of the recent mergers had involved relatively small companies and had not been
particularly anticompetitive. 40 At the same time, he noted that
Congress had assumed that concentration was rising, and that
this was bad for competition. He concluded that Congress's intentions must be honored, even if they were based on a faulty
premise. 41
Critics of monopolistic competition,42 The Modern Corporation and Private Property, and their progeny have argued that
they were based on faulty assumptions, failed to make reliable
predictions, or had very little influence on economic theory. 43
Some of this criticism in the antitrust literature of the Right has
to be classified as purely rhetorical, for it simply asserts the contrary as if it were truth carried down from the top of the
mountain. 44
In fact, as a model of market behavior, the theory of monopolistic competition has held up quite well and is probably as consistent with the data as is the Chicago School neoclassical model.
The same generally must be said of the Berle and Means thesis.
What it asserts is perhaps ultimately unprovable, because there
38. See Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1672-74 (1988).
39. See Bok, supra note 9, at 231.
40. See id. at 231-32 (citing Lintner & Butters, Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration, 1940-1947, 32 REV. EcoN. & STATISTICS 30 (1950) (concluding that the postWar merger movement generally was not harmful to competition)); see also E. MAsoN,
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 16-43 (1957) (reaching the same
conclusion as Lintner and Butters); Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 269 (1951) (concluding that concentration may actually have declined).
41. Bok, supra note 9, at 234.
42. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 309-21 (1983). Other literature is summarized in F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 385-89 (2d ed. 1980).
43. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, supra note 42, at 309-21; Hessen, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. AND EcoN. 273, 275-78 (1983); Stigler &
Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & EcoN.
237 (1983).
44. See, e.g., D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE 30-32 (1982).
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is a mountain of evidence pointing in inconsistent directions.
But even critics of Berle and Means cite evidence that tends to
establish their point: for example, the management of a takeover
target will frequently go tQ extraordinary lengths to resist, in
spite of the fact that their corporation and its shareholders will
benefit from the takeover. 0
The one distinct advantage of neoclassicism over monopolistic
competition is simplicity, in two different senses. First, the neoclassical model, particularly the hard-core Chicago School
model, tends to see no great difference in the behavior of product-differentiated and undifferentiated firms-or, at least it sees
much less difference than Chamberlin did. The result is that the
neoclassical model purports to generalize about market behavior
in a much broader way than the monopolistic competition model
does. For example, the simple assumption that price approaches
marginal cost, even in product-differentiated markets, is far
stronger within the neoclassical model. This makes the neoclassical model more elegant, but not necessarily better for the antitrust policymaker searching for "right" answers. In the same
sense, the Newtonian model of physical motion is simpler and
more unified than the general theory of relativity. But in certain
situations-as when one is seeking to measure the location of a
star or plot the trajectory of an interplanetary space probe-the
Newtonian model produces incorrect results. 46
The neoclassical model is also simpler in a second important
sense: it purports to make more confident and optimistic predictions about market behavior in the absence of regulatory intervention, including antitrust intervention. The neoclassical model
concludes that the minimally regulated market works quite well,
while monopolistic competition draws the much more pessmistic
conclusion that frequent governmental constraint is necessary to
maintain price, output, and product quality at the socially optimal level. In short, the neoclassical model yields a much simpler,
more manageable agenda for the economic policy maker than
does monopolistic competition. Bok's Section 7, written well
before the Chicago School revolution in antitrust economics, attempted to devise a simplified, more consistent antitrust policy
within the confines of what had, by 1960, become a substantially
modified monopolistic competition model.
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
REV. 1155 (1982).
46. See S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 10 (1988).

45.

MICH.

L.
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B. Bok's Section 7 and the Problem of Congressional Intent
Even economic models developed in the era of monopolistic
competition purported to distinguish between efficiency and distributive concerns. Within such models, one was concerned
about mergers because of their impact on "competition," economically defined. Thus, for example, a merger would be condemned because it tended to enhance the power of the postmerger firm to raise price above marginal cost. The
determinants of that question were far more complex than they
were within the classical or neoclassical models, and the policymaker in the age of monopolistic competition had far less confidence in the unregulated market than neoclassicists before and
after. But the basic questions were more or less the same.
Many of the impulses reflected by Congress when it amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 were not guided by any
economic model, but by the political agendas of the people who
debated and voted on the new statute. Some of these impulses
were manifestly "anticompetitive." For example, Congress was
concerned that, to the extent that a merger increased a firm's
efficiency by enabling it to reduce the costs of some input or
operation, smaller competitors would be injured. These competitors were a political constituency that Congress clearly deemed
worthy of protection. As a result, several suggestions appear in
the legislative history that efficiency-creating mergers should be
condemned, not because of their impact on consumers, which
even under the Chamberlinian model would have been positive,
but because they would injure smaller rivals;"
The great hostility toward mergers expressed in the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments rested, then, on two platforms: (1) a
factual assumption, increasingly criticized by 1950's era economists, that America had experienced a recent, dramatic, and anticompetitive increase in corporate concentration;' 8 and (2) a set
of political, or distributive, concerns generally inconsistent with
47. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16,433 (1950) (statements of Sen. O'Conor); 95 CONG. REC.
11,486 (1949) (statements of Rep. Celler). During the debate on the amendments to §§ 7
and 11 of the Clayton Act, Representative Celler stated:
Small, independent, decentralized business of the kind that built up our country, of the kind that made our country great, first, is fast disappearing, and second, is being made dependent upon monster concentration.
It is very difficult now for small business to compete against the financial,
purchasing, and advertising power of the mammoth coprorations.
Id.
48. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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economic efficiency. The latter overwhelmed the legislative history. To anyone preoccupied "with the economic consequences
of monopoly power," wrote Bok, "the curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of
concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.""9 The word "competition" in the debates "appeared to
possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered on
the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature." 110
Bok recognized the value of these noneconomic concerns in
the Celler-Kefauver Amendments and attempted to take them
seriously. He noted that "although truth is the preeminent aim
of economic study it can be only one of several goals in law." 111
But he responded to the expressed concerns of Congress in an
odd, inconsistent way that was to have a pernicious influence on
later Supreme Court opinions,'12 as well as those of lower courts.
In trying to be sensitive to both economic theory and the Congressional mandate, Bok first minimized the benefits that might
accrue from increased efficiency-assuming in the process that
such efficiencies, if they were to be found, were a good thing.
Then, in a set of inconsistent arguments, he treated the efficiencies that might result from mergers as if they were obvious and,
at least under some circumstances, anticompetitive.
In responding to the economic arguments in favor of permitting relatively substantial mergers because of their efficiencycreating potential, Bok answered that the cost savings that could
be achieved through merger could also be achieved through internal expansion. 113 Further, since horizontal mergers involve the
acquisition of existing plants, and not the construction of newer
or larger ones, they simply do not generate the kinds of intraplant economies that Bok believed were most important.
Bok generally adopted the view of economies of scale expressed in Bain's influential · Barriers to New Competition,
which had concluded that: (1) the principal kind of scale economy relevant to antitrust policy was the single-plant production
economy; and (2) in most industries, all the important economies of scale could be attained at relatively small market shares,
49.
50.
51.
52.
73-75
53.

Bok, supra note 9, at 236.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 227-28.
Notably, FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See infra notes
and accompanying text.
Bok, supra note 9, at 319.
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most generally on the order of five percent or less. 64 Bok discussed multiplant economies, which can be created by merger,
only briefly but concluded that they could be achieved by alternative routes, such as expansion, contracting out, or joint venture.66 He finally determined that "[t]here is little basis for concluding that the achievement of lower costs as such should give
rise to favored treatment under section 7," 66 but he based his
conclusion on the intent of Congress, which he felt obliged to
follow, rather than on economics. In this case, "[t]he possibility
of lower costs was brushed aside in the legislative deliberations,"
and there was "every reason to believe that Congress preferred
the noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of operations. " 67
In the second related but inconsistent set of arguments, Bok
appeared to concede substantial efficiencies that might result
from mergers but regarded them as harmful when they occurred.
For example, he appeared to approve of the government's argument in the Brillo case that a challenged merger would produce
substantial cost reductions, the result of which would "divert
substantial business from the other companies," as well as
Brillo's argument, in response, that the merger was harmless because it was not particularly efficient and the postmerger firm
would not steal customers from anyone. 68 Bok found the issue of
"whether lower prices in this context would be harmful or beneficial to the public interest" to be full of "difficulties,"-but the
difficulties he cited were ones of proof rather than principle. 69
For example, he suggested that it would be very difficult to establish whether the benefits that low prices produced for consumers outweighed the injuries that would accrue to competitors.60 Later, he suggested that "critical cost savings may give a
merger far greater significance than its size would imply"61 and
thus justify quicker condemnation.
54. See Bok, supra note 9, at 329 (citing J. BAIN, supra note 6, at 53-113).
55. Id. at 319 & n.278.
56. Id. at 318.
57. Id. (citing 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler) and 95 CONG.
REC. 11,496 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Boggs)).
•
58. Id. at 265 (summarizing the arguments made by both sides during the portion of
the Brillo litigation that occurred prior to the publication of Bok's article). For background on that part of the Brillo litigation, see Brillo Mfg. Co., [1957-1958 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 27,243 (May 23, 1958); Brillo Mfg. Co., [1959-1960
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 28,667 (Mar. 25, 1960).
59. Bok, supra note 9, at 265.
60. See id. at 265-66.
61. Id. at 278.
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When Bok developed his own presumptive standards, he
stated a concern with mergers "which lower costs, increase financial strength, or otherwise enhance the power of the leader,
since all such acquisitions might encourage or facilitate domination of rival firms." 62 Ambiguously, he suggested that mergers
that lower production or transportation costs are socially beneficial,63 while those that facilitate larger advertising or promotional budgets, or larger stockholder dividends, are harmful. 64 In
fact, his principal concern in the development of market share
standards for the acquiring firm was not the ability of the postmerger firm to raise price above marginal cost, but rather its
ability to "dominate" rivals. That is, he tended to regard even
the horizontal merger as an "exclusionary" practice, rather than
one that merely facilitated the exercise of the power to raise
prices to anticompetitive levels. 6~
Such indecisiveness about efficiency helped to produce the
terrible schizophrenia in 1960's merger cases concerning the appropriate role of cost savings. Only the most ham-handed analysis would condemn mergers precisely because they produced cost
savings that might injure competitors-but a few decisions even
did that. In Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and Gamble, 66 which condemned a potential competition merger between
a household chemical producer and a liquid bleach manufacturer, Justice Douglas drew the fairly innocuous conclusion that
"[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality,"
because Congress had "struck the balance in favor of protecting
competition."67 The Court noted that one effect of the merger
was that the postmerger Clorox Company could take advantage
of multiproduct advertising discounts unavailable to competitors
that produced only liquid bleach; 68 but the merger was actually
condemned under an early version of the "potential competition" doctrine69 because it reduced the potential for competition
that might have occurred had Procter and Gamble entered the
bleach market by building its own new plant. 70
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 321.
See infra text accompanying note 105.
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 573-74.
See VP. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
HoVENKAMP, supra note 26, § 12.4, at 328.
70. See 386 U.S. at 581.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

,m 1116-1126, at 69-161 (1980); H.

Journal of Law Reform

528

[VOL. 21:4

Some lower courts were less circumspect. For example, in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, 71 the Third Circuit granted a preliminary injunction
against a conglomerate merger between a company that made
electric equipment and one that made steel mills because the
merger would produce a company with the unique advantage
that it would manufacture a fully wired mill, ready to operate.
The court believed that this would give the firm an unfair competitive advantage over others in the market. 72 Likewise, in Purex Corp. v. Proctor and Gamble, 73 a private antitrust action
based on the same merger that was condemned by the Supreme
Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and Gamble, 1 •
the court opined that the plaintiff, a rival bleach manufacturer,
might recover damages based on injuries that accrued to it because of the acquired firm's increased efficiency. "Although such
economies may be unobjectionable in isolation," the court concluded, "they may be the basis of . . . liability if they serve as
part of the mechanism by which an illegal merger lessens competition."75 The court did not explain how efficiencies might lessen
competition; how they might injure competitor Purex was fairly
clear.

III.

BOK'S SECTION

7 AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL
RULEMAKING

Post-Chamberlinian, product-differentiated markets were far
more complex than classical and neoclassical markets. The evaluation of mergers in them was accordingly more complex as well.
Product differentiation, economies of scale and distribution in
71. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
72. See id. at 518.
The probable anticompetitive effects of [this] combination are significant.
Blaw-Knox's design and construction capabilities and its position as a leading
manufacturer of rolling mills, when coupled with Allis' position as the third largest supplier of the electrical drive components for such mills, would result in
Blaw-Knox becoming the only company capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal rolling mill. The emergence of a company offering such
a complete product would raise higher the already significant barriers to the entry of others . . . .
Id.
73. 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (remanding to district court for further proceedings),
judgment for defendant aff'd, 664 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983
(1982).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
75. 596 F.2d at 888.
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firm size, barriers to new entry, and structural conduciveness to
strategic behavior became increasingly relevant to merger policy.
Most economists of Bok's day believed that this panoply of factors had to be taken into account in merger cases, for each factor
was relevant to the thing the court was supposed to decide:
whether, on balance, a merger was competitive or anticompetitive. Bok argued that this insistence on analyzing every factor
was unrealistic, given the institutional limitations of the courts. 76
Furthermore, it was unnecessary, for a few presumptive rules
could produce reasonably accurate results. Bok suggested that
the economists' hostility toward such simple rules sprang largely
from criticisms of Supreme Court merger decisions of the 1930's
and 1940's, which had disavowed any economic approach in
merger cases, concentrating instead on such factors as the parties' intent or fault. 77 Bok believed that the Supreme Court was
now ready for a merger policy with a bona fide economic content, provided it could be simply administered. 78
The antitrust bar and legal academics who knew something
about economics had generally been siding with the economists
and incorporating one complexity after another into merger
analysis. One of the most important policy documents to show
this influence is the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 79 composed by a
large group of lawyers, law professors, and economists chaired
by Stanley N. Barnes80 and S. Chesterfield Oppenheim. 81 The
Committee's statement on merger policy listed a complicated
network of relevant factors to be taken into account, including
the size of the companies and the size differences among companies in the market, the degree of vertical integration, the "uses
of the product," and the "significance of the product under
study in the output or in the purchases of different companies;"
methods of sales and price interrelationships; barriers to entry;
opportunities and techniques of product innovation; limitations
on supply resources and economies of scale; and the "long-run
supply and demand picture."82 No effort was made to assess the
relative strength of these factors, to suggest whether all should
76. Bok, supra note 9, at 347.
77. See id. at 347-48.
78. See id. at 348-49.
79. REPORT, supra note 17.
80. At that time, Barnes was head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice.
81. At that time, Oppenheim was a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.
82. REPORT, supra note 17, at 126.
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be balanced against one another or whether some, such as absence of significant entry barriers, should be dispositive. No effort was even made to indicate how a court was supposed to collect the information. "The really striking aspect of the
discussion is the lack of any suggestion as to the manner in
which these factors may be applied in any given case," Bok complained of the report. 83 Nevertheless, the Committee majority
appeared quite confident that if courts and the enforcement
agencies took this array of factors into account, merger analysis
would be more accurate than it had been in the past. 84
"At the very heart of this paper," Bok wrote, "stands the conviction that economists, as well as lawyers, lack the knowledge to
make predictions concerning the probable consequences of many
... mergers . . . . " 811 He then offered the rather startling conclusion that more information could actually make judicial decisions about mergers less accurate, 86 particularly if the information were presented in the unstructured way suggested by the
Attorney General's Committee. Although economic models
might be correct in the abstract, the "normal theoretical
problems" of measurement of the relevant factors, such as the
degree of cost savings that a merger might produce or the extent
of entry barriers, "become much more imposing when they arise
in the context of litigation."87 Bok noted, for example, that economists were forever making simplifying "assumptions and rough
judgments" and incorporating them as premises into their models in order to make the analysis less ambiguous. 88 But the judge
. cannot simply assume that the largest firm is the price leader,
that the elasticity of demand is low, or that economies of scale
are of this or that magnitude. Each of these elements must be
83. Bok, supra note 9, at 257.
84. The Committee then rather optimistically concluded:
All of such facts cannot and need not be investigated in each case; only those
relevant in particular market contexts, and obtainable at reasonable cost, should
become a part of the record. In certain cases the relevant facts that can be obtained at reasonable cost may still leave gaps in the information that would be
helpful in reaching greater certainty as to the competitive consequences of an
acquisition. While sufficient data to support a conclusion is required, sufficient
data to give the enforcement agencies, the courts and business certainty as to
competitive consequences would nullify the words "Where the effect may be" in
the Clayton Act and convert them into "Where the effect is."
REPORT, supra note 17, at 126.
85. Bok, supra note 9, at 228.
86. Id. at 295 ("[T]here are reasons for suspecting that a consideration of all relevant
factors may actually detract from the accuracy of decisions made under section 7.").
87. Id. at 290.
88. Id.
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established in a litigation process very poorly calculated to arrive at economic truth. 89
Bok's own economic model for predicting the consequences of
mergers was as complex as anyone's. 90 He distinguished, however, between "theoretical" and "empirical" modes of economic
market analysis and suggested that merger policy needed to be
guided largely by the latter. 91 Although the theoretical analysis
was useful, it had practical application only to relatively gross
changes in market structure. Even a large merger affected overall market structure in only modest ways. 92 On the other hand,
while the empirical studies lacked a framework and thus made
generalization difficult, Bok believed they nevertheless had the
capacity to make realistic predictions in specific cases. Unfortunately, the state of empirical research was such that little useful
information had been produced, except concerning very highly
concentrated markets where most mergers would have been condemned anyway. 93 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bok
noted that none of the economic models took into account the
"wider range of [noneconomic] interests that to Congress
seemed critically important" in merger analysis. 94
Bok was not the only person in 1960 to be concerned about
the knowlege-assembling and economy-directing capabilities of
governmental institutions. In fact, the 1950's and 1960's were
decades of unprecedented soul-searching about regulatory government.05 That same year, SEC Chairman James M. Landis issued his sharply critical Report on Regulatory Agencies to the
President-Elect, 96 noting the poor record of federal agencies in
achieving their goals for a number of reasons, both political and
organizational.
By the time Bok wrote Section 7, government merger enforcement agencies had already acknowledged their own limitations
and attempted to simplify merger analysis. But the effort was
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., id. at 239 (discussing effects of product homogeneity on competition).
91. Id. at 240.
92. Id. at 241.
93. Id. at 247.
94. Id. at 248.
95. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1955); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETl'ER
DEFINmON OF STANDARDS (1962); Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 429 (1960); Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); see also T.
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 210-15 (1984).
96. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960)
(printed for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.).
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heavily influenced by the government's agenda, which, in 1960,
was apparently to prevent as many mergers as possible. The Antitrust Division had begun to rely on a single phrase in the
House Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the effect
that, under amended section 7, mergers were to be governed by
the same test that the Supreme Court had developed for other
sections of the Clayton Act. 97 The other section that the Antitrust Division had in mind was section 3,98 which applied to tieins and exclusive dealing agreements, both vertical arrangements. The government wished to apply to both horizontal and
vertical mergers the same "quantitative substantiality" test that
the United States Supreme Court had established for exclusive
dealing a year before the Celler-Kefauver amendments were
passed.BB Under that test, a merger would presumably be illegal
any time the acquired firm had a market share greater than six
or seven percent. 100 The government's argument was that because merger analysis was very complex, a simple presumptive
rule was necessary for judicial administration. 101 Why a rule that
was assumed to work for vertical arrangements should be presumptively valid for horizontal mergers as well the government
did not say.
Bok agreed with the government's argument for a simple presumptive rule but believed that a more sophisticated one could
be developed without producing the kinds of complexities that
economists' analysis of mergers had come to entail. Most importantly, he seemed to have a commitment, not shared by the enforcement agencies, that "beneficial" mergers were possible and
should be permitted or perhaps even encouraged. 102
97. See Brief After Trial for Plaintiff at 83, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (No. 115-328) (relying on H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (stating that the tests under amended § 7 "are intended to be
similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used
in other sections of the Clayton Act")).
98. 15 u.s.c. § 14 (1986).
99. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 298 (1949) (establishing the
test); see Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauuer Act-A Look at
the Record, 7 MERCER L. REV. 279 (1956) (concluding that Congress did not intend the
quantitative substantiality test to be applied to mergers).
100. Bok, supra note 9, at 250. Respecting horizontal mergers, such a test might indicate illegality any time the postmerger firm's aggregate market share exceeded six or
seven percent.
101. Interestingly, the Federal Trade Commission responded that the quantitative
substantiality test should not be applied in FTC merger cases because, as an administrative agency, it had the power to make finer judgments than the courts. Id. at 250-51.
Bok, however, found it irrational that two agencies having concurrent power to enforce
§ 7 would use different standards. Id. at 251.
102. Id. at 272-73.
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On the question of economic and statistical information, Bok
suggested that less is better than more, unless the additional information could be shown to make decisions reached in litigation
more accurate. When information overload is a real threat and
each piece of information indeterminate, knowing more does not
necessarily mean more accurate decisions; in fact, it may undermine our ability to reach them. 103
All of this was complicated by the fact that merger policy was
concerned with two different economic problems, which Bok
identified as "dominance" and "concentration."10' The dominance problem concerned the postmerger firm's ability to injure
its rivals, while the concentration question considered the likelihood of oligopoly pricing in the postmerger market. As noted
above, 1011 Bok accepted the prevailing belief of the day that even
horizontal mergers should be regarded as "exclusionary" practices. That is, the chief concern with them was not their shortrun ability to produce higher prices, but rather the power of the
postmerger firm to injure rivals. Furthermore, he implicitly relied on economic theories claiming that such practices were a
threat at market shares much lower than they are currently believed to make single-firm monopoly pricing or tacit collusion
possible.
The presumption that the anticompetitive threat of horizontal
mergers is principally "exclusionary" rather than "collusive" is
generally the reverse of the one entertained today. Horizontal
mergers in concentrated markets are condemned in the 1980's
because of the threat of tacit coordination of prices when the
postmerger firm's market share is substantially less than twenty
percent. However, today few people would be concerned about
predatory pricing by the postmerger firm unless it were very
large, perhaps having a market share on the order of sixty percent.106 As a result, any horizontal merger worthy of condemnation as exclusionary would be condemned on ordinary collusionfacilitating grounds.
Bok believed that, in most cases, the threat of dominance was
the greater one and that, as a result, presumptive merger rules
should be concerned with "increases in the spread between the
market shares of the first firm and its nearest competitor,mo7
particularly if the acquiring firm was the largest firm in the mar103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 273.
Id. at 279.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
See P. AREEDA & H. HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
Bok, supra note 9, at 281.
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ket. His basic presumption was fundamentally hostile. Section 7
was "most likely to achieve the objectives which underlay its
amendment" if rules were drawn "in such a way that the burdens of our ignorance fall upon the merging firms and not upon
the public interest in maintaining competition and restraining
monopoly power." 108 Bok suggested that the dominant firm in a
market should be forbidden from acquiring a firm with a market
share of greater than two or three percent. 109 When the acquiring firm was not the dominant firm, then the danger of collusion
became relatively more important, and the danger of dominance
became relatively less. Even here, Bok felt obliged to yield to the
Congressional understanding that growing concentration was as
problematic in "fragmented" industries as it was in "highly
oligopolized" ones. 110 As a result, merger policy should be concerned relatively less with absolute concentration in the market
affected by the merger, and relatively more with the increases
that result from the merger itself. Thus, a merger that increased
the market share of the postmerger firm by seven percent, in a
market where no premerger firm had a market share higher than
ten percent, was more suspect than a merger in a market with
three firms with twenty percent each, but which increased the
postmerger firm's market share by only four or five percent. Further, Bok believed that, since oligopoly was inherently a phenomenon that looked at all the firms in a market and not merely
at the parties to a merger, it would be very difficult to devise a
test based principally on the fear of increased likelihood of oligopoly pricing. m
Likewise, Bok wrote into his rules Congress's concern with
concentration trends, 112 suggesting that mergers should be more
suspect in markets that had steadily been growing more concentrated. As critics of the Warren Court era merger policy have
pointed out, 113 concentration trends often indicate that, owing to
changes in technology or modes of distribution, economies of
scale in a particular industry are more substantial than they had
been previously. The result is that the market has room for
fewer optimally sized firms than before, and it will experience a
"trend" toward concentration by either exit or merger until
108. Id. at 307-08.
109. Id. at 308.
110. Id. at 310.
111. Id. at 311.
112. See id. at 314-16.
113. For discussion, see H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 26, at§ 11.6; IV P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 69, 11 914, at 82 n.5 (1980).
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equilibrium is restored. Bok suggested that no merger by large
firms other than the dominant firm should be permitted if the
combined market shares of the two to eight largest firms 114 after
the merger were increased by seven to eight percent or more
over shares existing five to ten years before the merger.m Under
this rule, all premerger increases in concentration, whether by
expansion or acquisition, were treated more or less alike.
Bok suggested a presumptive rule that no acquisition of a firm
with a market share larger than five percent be permitted. 116
Bok also would have included a provision against a merger with
a particularly "disturbing" firm that was forcing competition in
the market, if the purpose of the merger was to eliminate that
firm's competition. 117 In the Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association case, 118 the Supreme Court condemned a merger
under this theory. A similar "disruptive" firm provision is written into the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines. 119
Finally, Bok attempted to account for Congress's concern that
acquisitions of failing firms be permitted, lest those firms be
driven out of business, even if such acquisitions would violate
the presumptive merger rules he had suggested. Bok noted that
the defense would often be raised against government merger
challenges unless it were limited so as to permit acquisition only
of firms likely to fail if the acquisition had not occurred. 120 Bok
suggested that prediction of business failure was generally easier
than the prediction of the impact of a merger on competition,
and that the greater the risk that the merger would injure competition, the stronger the evidence must be that the acquired
firm was failing. 121 He also believed that the defense should be
rejected presumptively if there were alternative prospective buyers for the failing firm, unless those buyers intended to use the
114. Bok permitted the government to select the number, provided that the number
selected included the acquiring firm. Bok, supra note 9, at 313.
115. Id. at 313-18.
116. Id. at 328. Compare George Stigler's proposals in Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 182 (1955), which would have forbidden per
se any acquisition yielding a postmerger market share exceeding 20%, and permitted any
merger yielding a postmerger firm whose market share was less than 5 to 10%. In between, mergers were to be studied by the agencies on a case-by-case basis.
117. Bok, supra note 9, at 323-24.
118. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
119. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 3.44(c)
(horizontal mergers), § 4.222 (nonhorizontal mergers), 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
120. Bok, supra note 9, at 342.
121. Id. at 343.

536

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:4

firm's productive assets in a different market, or to scrap
them. 122

IV.

CONCLUSION

Bok's Section 7 was cited by the Supreme Court in six merger
decisions 123 and numerous times by the lower courts. 124 Many of
the Supreme Court decisions citing Bok are on nearly everyone's
short list of repudiated Warren Court antitrust decisions to122. Id. at 345-47.
123. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974) (citing Bok
on the failing company defense); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
136 n.2 (1969) (including in a string cite on the failing company defense a cite to Bok,
supra note 9, at 339); FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is also argued that the large company generates psychological pressure which may force smaller ones to follow its pricing policies, and that its very
presence in the market may discourage entrants or make lending institutions unwilling
to finance them." (citing Bok, supra note 9, at 275)); United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270, 287 n.12, 301 n.33 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Bok for support of
the premise that a decline in the number of competitors does not necessarily entail a
reduction in competition and for the proposition that too harsh a merger rule will discourage future, efficiency-producing mergers); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362-64 (1963) (relying in part on Bok for the development of presumptive
standards); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312 n.19 (1962) (citing Bok
for a review of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver amendments); see also
Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311,
333 n.83 (1983) (concluding that the Supreme Court's analysis in Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank "owes a substantial intellectual debt" to Bok's article, because of its adoption of a
simple prima facie test for the legality of mergers).
124. Included among these are: Kaiser _Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d
1324, 1333 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that 1950 amendments call for stricter scrutiny of
mergers than the old Clayton Act did); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592,
606 n.32 (6th Cir. 1970) (comparing academic discussions of the failing company defense); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 625 n.34 (3d Cir. 1962) (relying on
Bok for the court's refusal to transplant the "quantitative substantiality" doctrine from
§ 3 of the Clayton Act to§ 7); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 826 n.31,
830 n.39 (9th Cir. 1961) (discussing the "quantitative substantiality" doctrine and the
effect on competition of loss of one substantial firm in the market); Erie Sand & Gravel
Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1961) (discussing the failing company defense);
United States v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 782 n.97 (D. Md. 1976)
(discussing the failing company defense); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78,
95 (D. Colo. 1975) (discussing the failing company defense); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp.,
306 F. Supp. 72, 87 n.56 (D. Haw. 1969) (discussing the legislative history of the CellerKefauver amendments concerned with protecting small business); United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (discussing numerous factors relevant to merger analysis); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F.
Supp. 867,929 n.170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (string citation); id. at 941 n.198 (suggesting a fiveto ten-year period over which to observe merger history to determine whether undue
increases in concentration are likely); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp.
530, 551 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (discussing the effect on competition of loss· of one substantial
firm).
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day, 1211 but several of those citations were not to Bok's substantive proposals. The 1968 Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice also show strong influence from Bok. 128
These Guidelines, which were not revised until the 1982 Guidelines replaced them, were an important guide to Antitrust Division merger enforcement policy for several years, although their
influence waned in the 1970's. 127 Unlike Bok, who was much
more concerned with single-firm dominance than with the likelihood of collusion in the postmerger market, the Guidelines expressed equal concern with both, albeit ambiguously. According
to the Guidelines, the principal purposes of horizontal merger
policy were:
(i) preventing elimination as an independent business entity of any company likely to have been a substantial
competitive influence in a market; (ii) preventing any
company or small group of companies from obtaining a
position of dominance in a market; (iii) preventing significant increases in concentration in a market; and (iv) preserving significant possibilities for eventual deconcentration in a concentrated market. 128
The Department's policy on mergers in markets exhibiting a
trend toward concentration during those years appears to have
been lifted straight from Bok's article:
Such a trend [toward concentration] is considered to be
present when the aggregate market share of any grouping
of the largest firms in the market from the two largest to
the eight largest has increased by approximately 7 % or
125. E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
126. U.S. Dep't of Just., Merger Guidelines - 1968, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 11 13,101, at 20,521-28 [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
127. Thomas E. Kauper, head of the Antitrust Division from 1972 to 1976, recalls
that the Division paid "little attention" to the Guidelines during that period. "We were
well aware that the Guidelines needed revision, but in the Watergate period, with a
weakened administration, that did not seem a politically sensible thing to do."
Professor Kauper also noted:
[W]hat strikes me is that Bok's piece had a significant impact on the decision to
issue guidelines at all. Bok's willingness to point the way to the use of numerical
standards, it seems to me, really set the stage for the issuance of a set of guidelines which made some degree of sense and had some element of practicality to
them.
Letter from Thomas E. Kauper to Herbert Hovenkamp (Mar. 4, 1988) (copy on file with
u. MICH. JL. REF.).
128. Merger Guidelines, supra note 126, at 20,523.
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more of the market over a period of time extending from
any base year 5-10 years prior to the merger . . . . The
Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisition, by
any firm in a grouping of such largest firms showing the
requisite increase in market share, of any firm whose
market share amounts to approximately 2% or more. 129
The Guidelines' basic market-share standards for assessing horizontal mergers show Bok's influence only a little less. Like Bok,
the Department was more concerned with the market share of
the merging partners than with the underlying level of market
concentration. It accorded "primary significance to the size of
the market share held by both the acquiring and the acquired
firms." 130 The Guidelines, however, regarded mergers in highly
concentrated markets as somewhat more suspicious than those
in unconcentrated markets and proposed harsher standards for
evaluating them. 131 The differences were not dramatic except in
the case of very large firms. In a highly concentrated market, for
example, the Department would permit a firm with a ten percent market share to acquire only a firm whose market share was
two percent or less, while, in a "less highly concentrated" market, the ten percent firm could acquire a firm as large as four
percent. But, in highly concentrated markets, any firm holding
greater than a fifteen percent market share would be prohibited
from acquiring even the tiniest firm, while, in a less concentrated market, that prohibition applied only to acquiring firms
whose market shares exceeded twenty-five percent. Finally, the
Department appeared to accept Bok's proposal that no firm be
permitted to acquire a firm whose market share exceeded five
percent, 132 and his proposal that acquisitions by "disruptive"
firms with a history of forcing competition in a market be
viewed with greater hostility. 133
In their influential treatise, Antitrust Law, Areeda and Turner explicitly rejected Bok's proposal that courts should be
much more hostile toward mergers in markets exhibiting a trend
toward concentration. m However, they agreed with Bok that the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (discussing the market share standards).
Id. at 20,524.
IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at 11 914.
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amount of concentration in a market was not particularly relevant to merger policy, except in close cases. 1311
Most of the earlier citations to Bok's work were "expansionist"-that is, they cited Section 7 for its analysis of the legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments or as a justification for using market share evidence to condemn
mergers. 138 Recent decisions, on the other hand, have cited Bok's
article for its conclusions about the inability of courts to deal
with difficult economic issues unless the courts are willing to
make certain simplifying assumptions. 137
Bok's single law review article enjoyed an extraordinary
amount of influence. That its influence today is less than it was
two decades ago in no way diminishes the great achievement of
Bok's Section 7. It demonstrates only that economic science as
well as law presents the antitrust policymaker with questions of
both value and fact; the changes that antitrust policy has experienced since 1960 are mainly a revolution of value.

135. See id. at 1111 912-913.
136. See supra notes 123-24 (listing of decisions citing Bok's article).
137. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. CAB, 766 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,
J.); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,
J.); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963), (relying
on Bok for the proposition that economic data are "complex and elusive" and that businessmen must be able to "assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence"). In the process, the Court developed virtual per se rules based on market share;
in this case, a postmerger market share of 30% was too high. Id. at 364-65. The test
proposed by C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 16, at 133, was postmerger market
share exceeding 20%, as was the test proposed by Stigler, supra note 116. Bok had not
developed an equivalent rule based on postmerger market share alone.

